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Abstract
The very nature of operations in peer-to-peer systems
such as BitTorrent exposes information about par-
ticipants to their peers. Nodes desiring anonymity,
therefore, often chose to route their peer-to-peer traf-
fic through anonymity relays, such as Tor. Unfor-
tunately, these relays have little incentive for contri-
bution and struggle to scale with the high loads that
P2P traffic foists upon them. We propose a novel
modification for BitTorrent that we call the BitTor-
rent Anonymity Marketplace. Peers in our system
trade in k swarms obscuring the actual intent of the
participants. But because peers can cross-trade tor-
rents, the k− 1 cover traffic can actually serve a use-
ful purpose. This creates a system wherein a neigh-
bor cannot determine if a node actually wants a given
torrent, or if it is only using it as leverage to get the
one it really wants. In this paper, we present our de-
sign, explore its operation in simulation, and analyze
its effectiveness. We demonstrate that the upload and
download characteristics of cover traffic and desired
torrents are statistically difficult to distinguish.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer file transfer protocols, such as the very
popular BitTorrent [4] protocol, provide massively
scalable architectures for distributing large files. Un-
fortunately, privacy is a direct casualty of the peer
cooperation that drives them. For traditional client-
server architectures, the client need only trust the
server not to reveal to additional parties the details of
the transaction. While some information is revealed
just from observing that the client and server com-
municated with each other, the specifics are confi-
dential. With appropriate cryptographic and protocol
mechanisms, the client can have strong assurances of
privacy in the transaction so long as the server re-
mains trusted.
On the other hand, in peer-to-peer cooperation, an
individual, by necessity, reveals details of the trans-
action to many parties, each of which must be trusted
if privacy is to be maintained. This problem is exac-
erbated by the nature of peers in such systems. In the
client-server model a user can limit interactions to
well-known, vetted servers, but in contemporary p2p
systems peers could be controlled by an incompetent
or malicious individual or organization.
A number of solutions to the peer-to-peer
anonymity problem have been proposed. The most
common solution in practice is to route traffic
through anonymity relays such as Tor [5]. Unfor-
tunately, Tor has, by default, no incentives for coop-
eration and struggles to scale with P2P workloads.
Our goal at the onset of this research was to develop
an anonymity mechanism for BitTorrent that incen-
tivizes participation and induces scalability. Such a
mechanism would provide better performance than
BitTorrent-over-Tor while still providing sufficient
anonymity guarantees. Furthermore, it would draw
BitTorrent users away from the Tor network and all
parties would be better off.
We have created the BitTorrent Anonymity Market-
place as novel solution to this problem. This system
provides genuine incentives for nodes to participate
in cross trading of multiple swarms obscuring the ac-
tual intent of the driving nodes creating what we refer
to as k-traffic-anonymity. We demonstrate in simula-
tion the effectiveness of this obfuscation and show
that it has nearly optimal performance tradeoffs. Our
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result is distinguished from other BitTorrent specific
anonymity solutions either because participation is
incentivized, or because the attack model we address
is more powerful.
This paper is organized as follows. We first re-
view some of the operations of BitTorrent and some
of the principles of incentives in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3 we review the current solution space to the p2p
anonymity problem. Then we introduce our own ob-
jectives and design in Section 4. We evaluate our
results in Section 5. Finally, we close with a discus-
sion of our research in Section 6 and our conclusions
in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 BitTorrent
BitTorrent [4] is a highly successful and popular
peer-to-peer protocol that enables efficient, rapid dis-
tribution of potentially large amounts of data to a
group of clients. It utilizes the available upload band-
width of the participants to scale to support many
users. Most important, it has built-in incentives
mechanisms that reward correct participation.
To make an item available for BitTorrent down-
loading, a publisher makes available a tracker and at
least one seed. The tracker follows the nodes partici-
pating in the swarm, helping nodes locate their peers.
Seed provide round-robbin, best-effort service to all
connecting peers.
To download the object, a group of nodes, collec-
tively called the swarm join the system by contacting
the tracker, indicating their intent to participate. The
tracker informs joining nodes of random subsets of
their peers. The nodes then establish direct connec-
tions with these subsets forming their local neighbor-
hoods. Thus joined, the nodes download the object
in equal sized chunks of the file called pieces. Nodes
share information with their neighborhood about the
pieces they have available and update them as new
pieces are acquired.
Nodes, however, limit the number of peers in their
neighborhood that can download from them at any
given time. They evaluate their peers based on how
much each has recently uploaded. The node then
provides download service to the top three or four
contributors. Each node also provides service to one
or two random nodes as a method of searching the
neighborhood for better partners. Thus, peers have
an incentive to contribute to their neighbors in order
to receive reciprocal contributions from their neigh-
bors in turn. When a node decides to service a peer, it
is said to unchoke the peer. Conversely, when it will
no longer serve the peer, it is said to choke it. Once
a peer is unchoked, it can send Request messages
asking for data. If the unchoking node refuses, the
peer considers itself snubbed and will not do busi-
ness with that node for some time. Nodes update
their peers with Have messages when a new piece is
received so that the neighborhood keeps abreast of
what a node can and cannot trade.
While a significant corpus of research has demon-
strated that BitTorrent can be exploited [17, 24, 22,
10], BitTorrent continues to work well in practice.
The incentives in BitTorrent are sufficient, at present,
for keeping the system stable. Indeed, while there is
no consensus on the true amount of BitTorrent data
in-flight today, it is clear that the number is large at
somewhere between one-third and one-half of all In-
ternet traffic [15, 8, 21, 18].
2.2 Incentives
Peer-to-peer systems’ greatest strength is their lack
of centralization. At the same time, this lack of cen-
tralization makes enforcement of peer behavior diffi-
cult. In general, the system designers intend for peers
to behave in a certain way, but peers may choose to
behave differently. Most nodes are assumed to be ra-
tional, or self-interested, and want to maximize their
benefit from the system while simultaneously mini-
mizing their own contributions. Faithfulness is the
measure of a node’s obedience to designer specifica-
tion. By definition, rational nodes are only faithful
if it is in their own interest, and, therefore, faithful-
ness can only be achieved by designing systems with
proper incentives [19, 20].
In previous work, we identified two general
classes of incentives in peer-to-peer systems: artifi-
cial and genuine [13]. Genuine incentives are char-
acterized by being an intrinsic property of the p2p
protocol, whereas artificial incentives are a super-
imposition of reward and punishment on top of an
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unincnentivized system. The intrinsic nature of gen-
uine incentives makes them more robust to rational
manipulations and are, therefore, preferred.
3 Related Work
A number of solutions to the peer-to-peer anonymity
problem exist or have been proposed. We briefly out-
line some of these approaches here.
3.1 Tor
Tor [5] is distributed network of relays operated by
volunteers that allows clients to route network traf-
fic through them to disguise the true origin. If used
properly, the client’s identity and physical location
are kept hidden from other entities. Per-relay encryp-
tion also provides anonymity against wire-traces and
packet sniffing. Each relay is allowed to define its
own policy about what it will and will not do for the
network. Entry routers, as the name implies, accept
traffic from outside the Tor network. Conversely, exit
routers allow traffic out to the true destination. Mid-
dle routers only relay traffic within Tor itself.
A node that desires anonymity computes an onion
route through the Tor network. It encrypts its packet
with a layer of encryption for each router in the net-
work. Each intermediate node peels off a layer of
encryption, and forwards the traffic to the next hop.
Each node only knows the preceding and subsequent
steps in the route. The nodes cannot be sure if the
packet they are receiving is from the original sender,
or simply a relay in the route.
Measurements taken in [11] indicate that 40% of
the traffic from a sample Tor exit node was used for
BitTorrent indicating how popular Tor is for provid-
ing BitTorrent anonymity.
Despite Tor’s usefulness, it does struggle with a
significant problem. It has trouble encouraging par-
ticipants to contribute new computers to serve in the
Tor network, impacting Tor’s ability to scale with the
traffic it receives. Additional nodes also strengthen
anonymity. However, the value of serving as a relay
to a user is unclear; it has no impact on the quality
of service that they observe from the Tor network.
Consequently, most users choose not to contribute.
Another important observation is that any nega-
tive legal or social response resulting from the orig-
inator’s connection will be borne by the exit node.
Consequently, many nodes have a strict disincentive
to not serve as an exit node.
Artificial Incentives for Tor Recently, researchers
have proposed extending Tor with incentives for bet-
ter participation. One proposal [12] is to create a
central authority that tracks each node’s contribu-
tions and publicizes their good behavior so that other
nodes can reward them. Alternatively, other research
proposes micropayments, where Tor users may buy
a higher quality of service [1].
3.2 BitTorent Specific Solutions
In addition to the Tor general anonymity network,
anonymity mechanisms have been proposed that are
specific to BitTorrent.
BitBlender [2] extends BitTorrent to route traffic
through peers in an anonymity directory. In a fash-
ion similar to Tor, members of the swarm can for-
ward requests through other peers providing a form
of anonymity it calls “k-anonymity.” They define
this as “users are indistinguishable from a set of k
users.” Unfortunately, as with Tor, BitBlender pro-
vides no incentive for nodes to offer relay services.
Please note that k-anonymity in their system is not
the same as k-traffic anonymity in our paper.
OneSwarm [9] attempts to solve the BitTorrent
anonymity problem more generally. Nodes have ex-
tensive control over what information about them-
selves they will share and with whom. In particu-
lar, OneSwarm would be used with social network-
ing so that information is only shared with “friends.”
OneSwarm does not solve the problem of maintain-
ing anonymity in large groups of untrusted peers.
SwarmScreen [3], in a fashion similar to our
work, proposes anonymity through the use of cover
traffic. In particular, they assert that nodes achieve
plausible deniability “by simply adding a small per-
cent (between 25 and 50%) of additional random
connections that are statistically indistinguishable
from natural ones.” SwarmScreen’s attack model has
an observer classify nodes based on the behavior of
the community they participate in. Its stated goal is
the disrupting of these “guilt-by-association” attacks,
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or in other words, obscuring the community that a
node is participating with at any given point in time.
We will make further comparisons to SwarmScreen
as we outline our own solution. Our work is only
superficially similar.
4 Design
Our objectives for this work break down into three
categories: anonymity, performance, and incentives.
As we detail our objectives, we will compare and
contrast our solution with SwarmScreen to illustrate
the differences in approach and philosophy.
Our primary goal is an obfuscation of participant
behavior that we call k-traffic-anonymity. Nodes in
our system must have an indistinguishability of in-
tent as they are observed by their peers. In other
words, a node’s peers can see that they are down-
loading k items but cannot distinguish which one of
them the node picked intentionally. The intentionally
picked torrent is called the native interest.
Our primary threat: observers wish to ascertain
a target node’s native interest. We call the attacker
an inquisitor and define three different classes of at-
tacks. Fully passive inquisitors do not contact any
other peers. Instead, these nodes exclusively scan the
tracker’s data on where nodes are participating. De-
coy passive inquisitors do contact peers and can ap-
pearance to participate. They may lie and announce
piece reception, make requests for pieces from their
peers, and in any other way appear to be normal
nodes, but they will not actually accept downloads
or make uploads. Finally, Active inquisitors can par-
ticipate and behave like any other node in the system.
Within our anonymity constraints, we want good
performance. We will measure performance in terms
of the number of additional download bytes required
to achieve a given level of anonymity. In an idealized
world where all torrents are the same size, optimal
performance for k-traffic-anonymity is k times the
number of bytes in a torrent. In other words, the node
downloads exactly k torrents and nothing more. Our
objective is nearly optimal performance; we are not
interested in designs, for example, that require 2k or
more download cost for k-traffic-anonymity.
Finally, our last objective is that the incentives
structure of our system encourages full participation
of the rational nodes. The critical incentive that we
identify is that participating in a torrent, purely for
anonymity reasons, can still offer performance ben-
efits. This is important for two reasons connected
with anonymity. First, to do otherwise would create
a system wherein some torrents might only ever have
natively interested nodes downloading it. This is a
form of anonymity starvation. Second, if there is no
value to the cover-traffic torrents in the download set,
an inquisitor might be able to distinguish the native-
interest in the set. By creating a system where all
torrents can be valuable as cover-traffic, nodes have
incentives to participate in them preventing torrent
starvation and obscuring the native interests of the
participants. We emphasize that this is a genuine in-
centive, requiring no additional enforcement mecha-
nisms or auditing.
In contrast, SwarmScreen is interested in a much
weaker attack model. They showed that BitTorrent
communities tend to form around interests rather
than around language, geography, or even friendship.
They further showed that these communities can be
monitored and classified by observing a small num-
ber of the nodes. The describe this invasion of pri-
vacy as “guilt by association” attacks. Finally, the
also demonstrated that monitoring just 1% of the net-
work is sufficient for assigning users to their com-
munities with 86% accuracy. They solve this attack
model by mixing in traffic to other random torrents
to obscure which community a SwarmScreen partic-
ipant belongs to. Defeating this simpler attack model
only costs them 25% to 50% overhead.
However, the stronger attack model we defeat with
our system is worth the increased cost. An observer
that can follow a SwarmScreen node for a long pe-
riod of time can easily determine which torrents the
node was downloading, because the node never fully
downloads the torrents it uses as cover traffic. At the
same time, our system also disrupts the guilt by as-
sociation attack as described.
BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, High-Level
Design. Our basic system works for any given k
level of anonymity. First, each node participates in
k different torrents simultaneously. It advertises all
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k torrents, hereafter called its active set, to its local
neighborhood. While the composition of the active
set can change over time, it must eventually com-
pletely download k complete torrents (we will call
these the download set), or else a long-term observer
could immediately filter out the cover-traffic.
Our design also requires that nodes will “cross
trade” their torrents, i.e., a node unchoke its peers’
requests for any torrent, not just the torrents where a
node has benefited from its peers. In our design, a
node will consider every possible torrent it sees ad-
vertised by its peers, and will prefer to join those tor-
rents which it believes will be most beneficial in its
quest to download its native interest.
The design of our valuation function is drawn from
models of supply and demand in economics [23]. In
general, the value of a torrent to a node is raised by
increased numbers of peers that desire it, while the
value is lowered by increased numbers of peers that
provide it. Unfortunately, it is impossible to directly
measure a torrent’s supply and demand in BitTorent,
and so we use several factors to approximate this.
These factors include how much of the torrent the
peer requires to complete it, Have announcements
indicating what it is currently trading, and direct Re-
quest messages to measure what is available.
We highlight that our valuation function was de-
rived from empirical data and not an economic or
mathematical model. Developing a coherent eco-
nomic valuation function is a significant research un-
dertaking in and of itself and is beyond the scope
of this paper. Our experimental version was con-
structed by taking the factors that impact the value
of a torrent and combining them in a weighted sum.
This construction, similar to how utility functions
are built [7], enabled us to experiment with differ-
ent weights for the factors by dialing up or down the
constant associated with that variable. Later in this
paper, we will detail our derivation of our constants
from experimentation.
The critical hypothesis tested in this work is
whether using a valuation function on torrents will
drive node behavior such that protocol exchanges re-
lated to the native interest are statistically indistin-
guishable from protocol exchanges for cover traffic.
The core idea is that a peer has no idea if a node
is asking for pieces of a torrent because it actually
wants it, or if it is just asking for those pieces be-
cause it has a high value due to the neighborhood’s
“market” conditions.
5 Evaluation
We employed a simulator developed in previous re-
search [14] to evaluate our implementation of the
BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace. The simulator,
running faster than real-time, enabled fast design cy-
cles. After completing a simulation, we studied the
results, modified the configuration, and re-ran our
experiments. This was a significant advantage over
using an artificial environment such as PlanetLab or
EmuLab to run a “real” BitTorrent client. Simulation
is also preferred to releasing a client to public users
because it allows us better access to system and client
state information and it avoids any potential legal or
ethical issues we are not yet prepared to confront.
5.1 Implementation
Our client implementation was developed to be as re-
alistic as possible in all stages of their operation. One
notable departure from a stock BitTorrent system is
that we assume the presence of a distributed hash ta-
ble (DHT) in which to store metadata, rather than the
more limited tracker functionality in the current Bit-
Torrent. What follows is an overview of how nodes
participate in the Marketplace.
Publishing. It is essential that objects exchanged
in the Marketplace are opaque to users that are unin-
terested in them. Otherwise, users may choose not to
trade in objects they deem overly sensitive. For this
reason, all content is encrypted and assigned random
identifiers. We assume out-of-band methods (e.g.,
publisher web servers) help users discover specific
torrents and obtain the decryption keys. In this man-
ner, participating nodes will trade in many torrents
without any knowledge of their content, except for
their own native interest, thus obtaining a modicum
of plausible deniability. Once a publisher has en-
crypted the object and created its random ID, it stores
a record similar to a torrent-file into the DHT and an-
nounces nodes that are seeding the torrent within the
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DHT.
Messages. All inter-peer communication consists
of unmodified BitTorrent messages with one excep-
tion. While normal BitTorrent Choke and Unchoke
messages identify a specific torrent, in the Market-
place these messages are not torrent-specific. These
two messages instead signal that the sender is willing
or unwilling to fulfill requests for any of the torrents
it has currently advertised.
Joining. To use the BitTorrent Anonymity Market-
place, a participant first acquires the random ID for
the desired object, as described earlier. Next, the
node joins the DHT and requests a list of active tor-
rents. From this list, the node creates a list of k tor-
rents consisting of its desired torrent plus k − 1 ran-
domly selected torrents. The node then indicates to
the DHT that it is joining those k torrents and re-
quests participating peers. The node creates a neigh-
borhood from these lists, preferring peers that show
up in multiple torrents.
Trading. After nodes join the system, they un-
choke peers in a manner similar to BitTorrent with
the highest upload services getting the unchoke slots.
However, in the Marketplace, all upload service
is adjusted by the estimated value of the received
pieces. Our implementation keeps the value constant
across an entire torrent, although different pieces
could ostensibly have different values. Once the val-
ues of the upload services are adjusted, unchoking
proceeds normally. At the same time, if the node can
find a more valuable torrent than the least valuable
torrent in its active set, it drops that torrent and joins
the new one.
Seeding and Termination. A Marketplace partic-
ipant must complete k downloads before leaving the
system. Before all k torrents have completed, a node
may find value in seeding one of its completed tor-
rents, depending on its observations of the supply
and demand for those torrents. Alternately, it could
forgo seeding and instead look for more profitable
ways to trade its available bandwidth.
5.2 Development of the Valuation Function
We have developed a valuation function based on
reasonable economic assumptions, refined by exper-
imentation, and suitable for enabling our evaluation
of our anonymity objectives. We started with basic
supply and demand concepts [23]. In other words,
we accept the assumption that increased desire and
scarcity raise the value of a given object, while de-
creased desire and abundance reduce the value of
same. In terms of the BitTorrent Anonymity Mar-
ketplace, the number of nodes wishing to download
a pieces of a torrent constitute the desire, and the
nodes that can service those requests constitute the
supply. These two factors are the basis for our valu-
ation function.
Unfortunately, the node cannot measure these fac-
tors directly and must therefore estimate them. For
example, a node sees all the peers within its neigh-
borhood, but it cannot see further. It cannot see ev-
ery peer participating in every torrent, thus it can-
not determine the global supply and demand of tor-
rent pieces, nor even can it determine any other
peer’s view of this data. To estimate supply, Market-
place nodes treat what they can see, within their own
neighborhood, as an estimate for what their peers can
see. (Neighborhood visibility is not transitive. IfA is
in B’s neighborhood and B is in C’s neighborhood,
there is no guarantee that A knows anything about
C.) Nodes can make a better estimate about the de-
mand for a torrent by totaling the number of pieces
required for their peers. They then combine these
two estimates into a single factor hereafter referred
to as approximate demand over supply.
In addition to this information, BitTorrent nodes
can make use of the Have announcements and Re-
quest messages from peers to know more about de-
mand in the neighborhood. The Have messages indi-
cate a degree of freshness to what torrents neighbors
are trading and, of course, Request messages are the
strongest, most straight-forward measure of demand
available.
Our early valuation function was a weighted sum
of these three factors. Using this construction, each
factor could be experimentally measured to deter-
mine if it had an impact at all, and the ideal weight-
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ing could be derived experimentally using our simu-
lations. By fixing a weight of 1 to all but one factors,
the remaining factor can be evaluated independently.
Setting this experimental factor to 0, for example,
completely eliminates its impact on the function.
For testing the Marketplace, we fixed k = 5, set
the total number of torrents in the marketplace to
40, initiated 100 clients plus 40 seeds, and used 125
MB files for each torrent1. For simplicity, all the
clients have the same upload and download speeds
of 1Mbps, start at the same time, and end when their
k downloads are complete. To test the effects of tor-
rent popularity, we configured 10% of the torrents to
be the native interest of 50% of the clients.
Our initial simulations immediately demonstrated
that our initial valuation function was insufficient.
Regardless of configuration, the clients in the sim-
ulation would not complete their downloads. We de-
termined that the nodes were dropping the torrents
in their active set, regardless of how much they had
completed, for a new torrent that was surging in pop-
ularity in their neighborhood. We decreased the fre-
quency at which nodes would update their active set
but that didn’t solve the problem sufficiently.
After some additional experimentation, we deter-
mined that because one of the goals of the node is to
complete k downloads, the completeness of a torrent
should factor into the valuation function. In other
words, if all other factors are equal, a more complete
torrent should be valued higher than a less complete
one. We retooled the valuation function with this
new factor and re-ran the simulations and were re-
warded with converging results.
Using our more mature valuation function, we
tested the factors in the function independently. For
each factor tested, we experimented with weights of
0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0 and 16.0. For
completeness, we also tested a few other non-value
related variables such as how often the node updates
its active set, and so forth. In total, we ran fifty dif-
ferent different configurations of the simulator, again
fixing all but one factor at a time and varying it across
1Individually 125 MB is a small file for BitTorrent, but be-
cause our nodes are exchanging five files simultaneously, the
amount of data in transit is 625MB per client.
this broad range of weights.
These tests demonstrated, again, that biases to-
ward completing torrents that have been started are
essential, and that data collected from direct requests
is the best proxy for overall demand. When we re-
configured the simulation to ignore direct requests,
performance worsened by nearly twenty percent. In-
terestingly, the remaining factors proved to be much
poorer estimates of demand and had little impact on
average performance. However, they are useful to
a node at times when the node has not recently re-
ceived any such requests. A small weight for these
factors was better than no weight at all. We conclude
that when the direct request factor is in play, it should
dominate the equation. However, when the direct re-
quest factor drops to zero, these weaker factors serve
as a backup.
While the specific coefficients of valuation func-
tion are optimized for our simulation configuration
and are thus not directly applicable for a real-world
deployment, the insights obtained from this empir-
ical evaluation are still essential. Moreover, we
can now test our central hypothesis: will cross-
trading nodes that use a valuation function to decide
which cover-traffic nodes to trade have the k-traffic-
indistinguishability property?
5.3 Anonymity Results
To evaluate anonymity, we took the best observed
weight for each of the valuation factors and recon-
figured the simulator appropriately. With this valua-
tion configuration, we ran twenty simulations. Each
took several hours to complete on a 2.4 Ghz Athlon
and covered approximately 7 hours of simulation
time. Each run involved about 70GB of simulated
data transfer and approximately 10 million control
messages. The simulations output logs that detail
the data transfers and control messages and we used
them to trace how the peers interacted with each
other as well as to calculate costs and determine per-
formance.
Our primary goal was to quantify indistinguisha-
bility of intent. This property means that a node
downloading 1 native interest, and k − 1 cover traf-
fic torrents will not reveal its native interest by its
behavior to its peers. We will examine three node
7
Figure 1: The mean start rank of native interests
plotted against popularity. The x-axis is the number
of peers natively interested in the torrent, the y-axis
is the starting rank. The error bars show the standard
deviation. The wide standard deviations mean that
native interests have a wide range of start rank.
behaviors that could potentially reveal the native in-
terest to peers: start times for torrents, end times for
torrents, and download patterns.
Start Time. We first evaluate the indistinguishabil-
ity of start times, where start time is measured as an
integer rank. In other words, the first torrent that a
node makes requests for is ranked 1, and the sec-
ond torrent that a node makes requests for is ranked
2, and so on. We evaluated this aspect of indistin-
guishability in two ways.
First, we checked that there was sufficient variabil-
ity of start times for native interests. It is important,
of course, that native interests not have a predictable
start rank. Our results are shown in Figure 1. The
graph is parameterized on the number of nodes na-
tively interested in the torrent, as a measure of popu-
larity. The y axis is the average start rank for nodes
of that popularity and the standard deviation. The
graph shows that the standard deviation is high for
start rank, so a node’s native interests are suitably
obscured from its peers.
Our second measure of the indistinguishability of
start times is to measure the average start time for
the same torrent for peers that are natively interested
relative to peers that are not (see Figure 2). There
is a noticeable shift to earlier start times for native
Figure 2: The mean start rank of the various torrents
plotted against the start rank for the same torrent
for peers not natively interested. This graph shows
that native interests do start sooner, but the mean lies
within the standard deviation of non-native interest
start times for most torrents.
interests. Nevertheless, the average times for the na-
tive interests lie within the standard deviations of the
start times for non-native interests. The distributions
are not statistically different enough to be detectable.
Furthermore, the native and non-native graphs have
similar shapes, suggesting similar behavior for the
two populations.
End Time. It is also important that native interests
not end predictably. Expressing end times as inte-
ger ranks, we evaluated the variability of native end
times in Figure 3 and compared those times to non-
native end times in Figure 4. These graphs show that,
as with start times, there is a wide variability in the
end times and that the mean is within the standard
deviation of cover-traffic start times.
Download Rates Over Time. Finally, we exam-
ined the rate of piece transmissions for native and
non-native populations in the Marketplace to verify
that transmission patterns are indistinguishable. We
created our transmission pattern by aggregating each
node’s download volume within 500 second buckets.
All nodes are normalized such that their first 500 sec-
ond slice of time is slice 0, the second 500 seconds is
slice 1, and so forth. Within each slice, we separated
the download volume for the native interest from the
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Figure 3: Similar to Figure 1, this graph shows the
mean ending ranks and the standard deviation. As
with start times, end times vary sufficiently to make
them poor predictors of interest.
average download volume for the cover-traffic. The
average for all nodes and the standard deviations are
computed for each time slice. Figure 5 shows the
download pattern for all nodes across the entire sim-
ulation. We again observe that the nodes’ averages
for native traffic is within the standard deviation of
the cover-traffic. Note also that this graph represents
a global view over all nodes, so this any node’s local
view would have higher error.
We can examine a weaker observer by computing
the observed download patterns for a single client.
That is, for each node, we aggregated all the traffic
that only that node observed directly. As before, we
aggregated into 500 second buckets, dividing the na-
tive interest traffic from cover traffic. Then we used
the average and standard deviations for each node’s
observed patterns to create Figure 6. The two types
of traffic overlap even more in this graph, demon-
strating that a single peer observes less differences
between native interest traffic and cover traffic then
can be observed across the swarm as a whole.
5.4 Analysis
We now revisit anonymity against each of the in-
quisitors that we previously identified.
Passive Inquisitor. These nodes do not directly in-
teract with any actual nodes but only talk to the
tracker or DHT. The passive inquisitor can, at best,
Figure 4: The mean end ranks for native interest
compare to mean end ranks for non-native interest.
As before, there is a noticeable shift downwards, but,
as before, the means for the native interests tend to
lie within the standard deviations of the non-native
interests.
track a given node’s active set. From this infor-
mation, it cannot determine the node’s native inter-
est. As we demonstrated, the entrance and exits of
a given torrent in a node’s active set appear indistin-
guishable, regardless of the torrent’s status as native
interest.
Decoy Passive Inquisitor. These nodes directly in-
teract with other nodes, but do not actually exchange
pieces. They can, however, advertise pieces and un-
choke other nodes. Such inquisitors gain additional
information, because rational nodes will drop them
regularly for their poor performance. However, with
a Sybil attack [6], these nodes can connect to a given
node over and over from different IP addresses, sim-
ulating a continuous connection. Such a Sybil attack
could track the traffic of a rational node by capturing
all Have announcements. Nevertheless, even a Sybil
attacker will not determine the node’s native interest
from this information because, as we demonstrated,
the download rates for a given torrent for a node are
similar, regardless of the node’s native or non-native
interest in that torrent.
Active Inquisitor. The most powerful non-wiretap
node, these nodes actively trade with peers in the net-
work. This feature allows them to attempt to “trick”
9
Figure 5: Native and non-native traffic patterns
super-imposed. While native traffic is above non-
native traffic for the same node, the median for the
native is within the standard deviation of the other.
a victim node into revealing state through carefully
crafted trading. For example, an active inquisitor
might obtain a large number of blocks from all the
nodes in active set. Then, it might selectively adver-
tise these blocks to the victim to see which blocks the
victim takes a higher interest in. Furthermore, a very
well provisioned inquisitor might introduce identi-
fiable torrents into the marketplace that it can use
to manipulate torrent values within a neighborhood.
The active inquisitor can use such value manipula-
tion to attempt to pierce the indistinguishability.
At present, we have not yet attempted to simulate
active inquisitors. Nevertheless, we expect that un-
less the inquisitor can control a large portion of a vic-
tim node’s local neighborhood (e.g., using a Sybil at-
tack), it cannot have high confidence about the moti-
vation for a node’s interest in any given torrent. This
attack, however, is made non-trivial because DHTs
or trackers give out random subsets of the peers to a
participating node, thus dramatically increasing the
costs of overtaking a node’s neighborhood. Never-
theless, Sybil attacks are a significant security issue
and remains a point of research.
In addition to our successful anonymity results, we
also quantified the costs in these simulations. The
amount of data downloaded, expressed as a multiple
Figure 6: This figure is similar to Figure 5 but lim-
ited to the viewpoint of single clients. In other words,
the former figure is a global representation of down-
load patterns, while this figure is representative of
what a single peer observes.
of a single torrent, averaged 5.71 ± 0.43 Given that
the optimal value is 5, this indicates that our nodes
are not wasting a lot of time downloading torrents
that they do not complete.
To conclude our evaluation, we review our incen-
tives qualitatively along two of three axes suggested
by previous work [19, 20]. We now consider incen-
tives for communication and incentives for compu-
tation. There is no need to evaluate incentives for
message passing because the Marketplace, as in reg-
ular BitTorrent, does not have peers relay messages
for one another.
Incentives for Communication. The first question
is, does a rational node have any incentive to lie
about its state?
1. Active Torrents: The only incentive for a
node to lie about its active set is for increased
anonymity against passive inquisitors. How-
ever, we have demonstrated that the native in-
terest of a node is not revealed by the makeup
and dynamics of the active set. Furthermore,
the active set is necessary for performance and
anonymity. Therefore, there is no incentive to
lie about this state.
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2. Choke Status: There is no incentive for a ra-
tional node to misinform a neighbor about the
choke state between them. A lie about choke
status might result in a snub, which is undesir-
able.
3. Piece-Interest Status: The incentives to lie
about this are unclear. There is an incentive
for a node to announce that it has pieces, even
for pieces it does not actually have because the
value of the torrent in the marketplace will in-
crease. On the other hand, unchoked neighbors
may ask for these pieces and subsequently snub
the lying node when it cannot produce them.
We have not yet quantified these incentives, but
snubing is undesirable, providing a disincentive
to this behavior.
4. Piece Requests: A node has an incentive to
request pieces that it already has in order to
drive the value of the torrent higher. However,
it also affects the value of torrents by pretend-
ing not to have the piece. Requesting pieces al-
ready present costs additional bandwidth, which
is valuable and limited, so that behavior is cer-
tainly disincentived. Similarly, pretending not
to have a piece means that a peer who might
have something to trade might skip over this
node. As with core BitTorrent, Marketplace
nodes have an incentive to participate normally
in torrent trading such that they get what they
want in an efficient manner.
Incentives for Computation. We next ask, does a
rational node have any incentive to compute a non-
conforming value for torrents in the marketplace?
The answer is no, by definition, because nodes will
compute their own market valuations. Theoreti-
cally, all nodes have an incentive to develop effective
methods of evaluating torrents of non-native interest.
The cooperation model supports and encourages this
form of self-interested operation.
In summary, the Marketplace is built on a sound
foundation of incentives, although some small com-
ponents are currently manipulable, and aggressive
Sybil attacks may be able to weaken the anonymity
guarantees. These are open problems for future re-
search.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Our proposal of the BitTorrent Anonymity Market-
place is a valuable contribution to p2p-anonymity,
particularly if an implementation of it could draw
away traffic from Tor. However, our work has pro-
duced many more questions than it has answered.
6.1 Stronger Anonymity and Ethical Issues
Our anonymity model is designed to shroud a peer’s
intentions from the observations of its neighbors.
However, many BitTorrent users would be interested
in shrouding their intentions from adversaries that
can tap their wire, such as their ISP. The BitTorrent
Anonymity Marketplace could potentially be hard-
ened to improve anonymity in such cases when the
adversary can tap the peer’s line.
Per-peer encryption. Peers can communicate
with one another via encrypted links, an optional fea-
ture already present in BitTorrent. This immediately
hides the message exchanges that divulge the Mar-
ketplace’s state. Despite this link encryption, an ad-
versary would still have access to the public informa-
tion in the DHT.
Late-start native interest. A node does not need
to connect to its native interest upon initialization.
Instead, it can choose its k-active set randomly,
which may or may not include the native interest.
If not present in the initial active set, the node can
rotate it into activity at a later time.
Even split peers. Because our system biases a
node’s selection of its peers based on the value of the
torrents they are trading, an observer could approxi-
mate the value of each torrent to the node based on
its neighbor selection. Nodes could remove this bias,
selecting peers evenly from their desired torrents.
Improving cover traffic. Users that are sensitive
to their anonymity should ensure that the Market-
place is well stocked with items that are legitimate
candidates for cover traffic. Such items would in-
clude sensitive, but highly-legal objects that provide
better plausible deniability.
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This last point about cover traffic leads to interest-
ing ethical questions about the BitTorrent Anonymity
Marketplace because it will, without a doubt, pro-
vide cover for individuals engaging in illegal and
reprehensible behavior. Unfortunately, it is often the
assumption that anonymity only benefits individuals
engaging in such actions. The truth is that anonymity
is valuable for many legitimate purposes. For exam-
ple,
• An individual with a medical condition may not
wish to reveal it. Doing research on the internet
can expose them to other parties. The BitTor-
rent Anonymity Marketplace does not provide
anonymity for the initial search for documents
(a standard service like Tor is well suited to this
task), but could provide cover for downloading
and viewing a video about treatment options.
• Legality is highly dependent on the jurisdiction.
What may be legal in one region of the world
may be highly illegal somewhere else. Such
content may be sensitive to the downloader even
if it is legal. This is especially true if the down-
loader is from, or has ties to, a jurisdiction
where it is illegal.
• Anonymity also protects individuals from com-
mercial exploitation. In cases where BitTor-
rent is being used for legal content, corpora-
tions can easily learn a user’s tastes and interests
from very simple observations of the tracker or
DHT. Absent regulations to the contrary, corpo-
rations will naturally begin using this informa-
tion to target users with advertising and so forth.
The BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace signifi-
cantly reduces the effectiveness of such attacks,
since many or most of the nodes participating
in any given torrent will be there for the cover-
traffic, not because it’s their native interest. In
fact, they will have no idea what they’re sharing.
The effectiveness of the Marketplace is greatly in-
creases when there are many kinds of legitimate, yet
sensitive, torrents actively in trade. On the other
hand, if only illegally copied music is found therein,
it won’t matter if you have k-anonymous cover traf-
fic. K illegal music or movie downloads is no better
(and, in fact, could be worse) than just one.
That said, there will be individuals that would
be interested in using a service such as the Bit-
Torrent Anonymity Marketplace to engage in ille-
gal behavior. They should be aware that k-traffic
anonymity will probably not shield them effectively
from government observation (see, e.g., You-are-not-
a-lawyer [16]). It is possible, however, that the Bit-
Torrent Anonymity Marketplace does help to cover
users against corporate investigation. For corpora-
tions looking to bring lawsuits against individuals
based on downloads, the BitTorrent Anonymity Mar-
ketplace greatly increases the cost of determining in-
fringement, and introduces a risk of false positive to
the suing company.
Can a user be held legally liable for download-
ing a torrent, as cover traffic, assuming the content
in question would be illegal to have downloaded via
ordinary means? The essence of the user’s defense
would be that they were just helping random peers to
download content, while they, themselves, were get-
ting something entirely different. Of course, if they
are faced with all k of their encrypted downloads and
asked to prove which one they can decrypt, they may
be stuck. Furthermore, even if the user legitimately
doesn’t know what is being downloaded, the adver-
sary might well crawl the various content discovery
sites (e.g., PirateBay and the like), creating their own
reverse-mapping from encrypted torrents to their true
identities.
As such, the degree of anonymity proffered by
the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace seems to be
comparable to serving as the exit node of Tor or
another such onion-route system. The exit node is
clearly observable doing fetching what could well be
illegal content. The exit node’s operator may well
claim that the content in question was being deliv-
ered to a third party, but the exit node is clearly par-
ticipating in the process. Of course, such arguments
quickly become absurd. Internet core routers cer-
tainly have significant volumes of undesirable con-
tent transiting them every day, all day long. They
might claim a “common carrier” defense if sued.
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Could a BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace node, or
for that matter a Tor exit node, claim a similar de-
fense?
6.2 Informed Risk
One possible development to the BitTorrent
Anonymity Marketplace would be channels that
inform the participant of risk. In particular, these
third-parties would uncover the content names and
descriptions for the opaque DHT identifiers. Users
of these services could then fill their active sets with
elements from white lists or prevent elements from
black lists from getting in. This would, of course,
erase plausible deniability about not knowing the
content. However, the user could choose their own
level of risk.
Most importantly users could be absolutely sure
that morally, ethically, and legally unacceptably
risky content, such as child pornography, would
never pass through their systems. Users looking for
anonymity for sensitive but legal content, such as
medical treatment videos, could also ensure that they
were not taking any legal risks for their behavior and
might, instead, find themselves downloading medical
videos for a wide variety of different ailments. More-
over, certain organizations that believe in civil dis-
obedience to what they perceive as unjust laws might
purposefully participate in providing cover traffic for
certain classes of torrents. Curiously, the black list
for one organization might be a white list for another.
As a concrete example, consider a government that
runs a black list of videos that are deemed illegal for
whatever reason (e.g., criticism of the king is ille-
gal). Citizens within that country that wish to have
anonymity and avoid legal risk could use that list as
a black list. Other individuals, inside or outside of
the country, might treat that as a white list, looking
to provide cover traffic for those torrents by making
them more popular.
6.3 Future Work
Several aspects of the BitTorrent Anonymity Mar-
ketplace remain unresolved or require further explo-
ration. The aforementioned legal issues are one such
area. It would be valuable to explore the legal pos-
sibilities of the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace
under the laws of various jurisdictions.
Another area of significant future research is the
valuation function that each peer performs on the tor-
rents it is trading. Just as we are not lawyers, we are
also not economists. We recognize that the economic
interactions of our proposed system are complicated
but subtle. In a real world implementation, there
might be thousands of torrents and hundreds of thou-
sands of clients in the Marketplace, not to mention
churn, disparities of upload and download capaci-
ties and so forth. It will be a daunting challenge to
uncover a generalized valuation function that works
well under all circumstances.
Our current simulations are pedagogical and unre-
alistic. In particular, we have not studied the BitTor-
rent Anonymity Marketplace under realistic churn or
other such conditions. Because our simulations lack
these features, we have been unable to see some pre-
dicted behaviors that require them. Also, in a real-
world scenario, torrents will be of different sizes and
nodes would have widely varying network perfor-
mance. Different nodes might have different values
of k-anonymity that they desire. It would be con-
venient if the choice of k value for a client had no
impact on its neighbors, but we have not examined
this.
We have also not completely explored the attack
space for either inquisitors or rational attackers. Our
simulation does not yet include an active inquisitor
that attempts to introduce tainted information in an
effort to reveal the interests of peers. Similarly, our
simulations do not yet include a rational manipula-
tors that lies about state in an effort to manipulate
torrent values.
Finally, it should be obvious that simulation
alone is insufficient for evaluating the BitTorrent
Anonymity Marketplace. An actual implementation
must be created and evaluated for real-world opera-
tions. A whole host of difficulties is involved in such
development, although most of them are legal, rather
than technical.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have explored a new method for
cooperative anonymity in BitTorrent swarms, called
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the BitTorrent Anonymity Marketplace, where peers
exchange pieces of multiple torrents based on their
value for trading with other peers. This creates a
world where intent is difficult to discern because mo-
tivations are obscured by the shifting values within
the local neighborhood. Nodes always download k
different torrents, selected randomly, to completion,
obscuring their true intent, yet still biased in favor of
increasing the nodes’ observed performance.
With detailed event-based simulations, we demon-
strated that the download behavior for native inter-
ests and cover traffic was statistically similar, mak-
ing it difficult for observers to distinguish between
the two. We also demonstrated in simulation that our
Marketplace completes without unreasonable over-
head beyond the cover traffic’s costs. We also evalu-
ated the incentives of our system and found that the
overall setup is sound against rational manipulations,
but that there are obvious places for exploitation.
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